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Objective: Uptake of human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccinations by 17- to 18-year-old girls in England
is below (35%) target (80%). This trial assesses (a) the impact of financial incentives on uptake and
completion of an HPV vaccination program, and (b) whether impacts are moderated by participants’
deprivation level. It also assesses the impact of incentives on decision quality to get vaccinated, as
measured by attitudes toward the vaccination and knowledge of its consequences. Method: One thousand
16- to 18-year-old girls were invited to participate in an HPV vaccination program: 500 previously
uninvited, and 500 unresponsive to previous invitations. Girls randomly received either a standard
invitation letter or a letter including the offer of vouchers worth £45 (€56; $73) for undergoing 3
vaccinations. Girls attending their first vaccination appointment completed a questionnaire assessing
decision quality to be vaccinated. Outcomes were uptake of the first and third vaccinations and decision
quality. Results: The intervention increased uptake of the first (first-time invitees: 28.4% vs. 19.6%, odds
ratio [OR]  1.63, 95% confidence interval [CI; 1.08, 2.47]; previous nonattenders: 23.6% vs. 10.4%,
OR 2.65, 95% CI [1.61, 4.38]) and third (first-time invitees: 22.4% vs. 12%, OR 2.15, 95% CI [1.32,
3.50]; previous nonattenders: 12.4% vs. 3%, OR 4.28, 95% CI [1.92, 9.55]) vaccinations. Impacts were
not moderated by deprivation level. Decision quality was unaffected by the intervention. Conclusions:
Although the intervention increased completion of HPV vaccinations, uptake remained lower than the
national target, which, in addition to cost effectiveness and acceptability issues, necessitates consider-
ation of other ways of achieving it.
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Human papillomavirus (HPV) is a ubiquitous sexually transmit-
ted virus that could lead to cervical cancer (Brabin et al., 2005;
Moscicki et al., 1998), the second most common cancer in women
worldwide (Ferlay et al., 2010). HPV vaccines help prevent infec-
tion with “high-risk” strands of HPV that are associated with later
cancer development (Ault, 2007; Franco & Harper, 2005). Immu-
nization against HPV requires completion of three vaccinations to
effectively reduce the risk of cervical cancer (Ault, 2007; Joura et
al., 2007). The degree of protection afforded by incomplete im-
munization is currently unknown (Widdice, Bernstein, Leonard,
Marsolo, & Kahn, 2011).
Since September 2008, a national program has been imple-
mented in England and Wales, United Kingdom, aiming to vacci-
nate girls aged 12 to 13 years against HPV. A 2-year “catch-up”
campaign targeting 17- to 18-year-old girls has also been initiated.
The objective of these vaccination programs is to provide three
doses of the HPV vaccine to females before they become sexually
active, when the risk of HPV infection and subsequent cervical
cancer development increases. It is estimated that if this objective
is met and vaccination coverage is sufficiently high (80% of the
target population), up to 400 deaths per year in England could be
prevented (Sheridan, White, Barlow, & Soldan, 2010). Although
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the national program targeting 12- to 13-year-olds has met the 80%
uptake target set by the National Health Service (NHS),1 with
88.1% of girls receiving the first vaccination, and 80.1% receiving
the third, the catch-up campaign targeting 17- to 18-year-olds has
resulted in below-target uptake, with 62.2% of girls receiving the
first vaccination and only 31.8% receiving the third (Sheridan et
al., 2010). Apart from these cohort differences, uptake of the HPV
vaccine in England is also marked by social inequalities, with girls
living in deprived areas and from ethnic minority backgrounds
being less likely to get vaccinated (Roberts et al., 2011). Women
from these populations are also more likely to develop cervical
cancer (Shack, Jordan, Thomson, Mak, & Møller, 2008).
Offering girls financial incentives to undergo the HPV vaccina-
tion could increase uptake rates. Financial incentives are increas-
ingly being considered and used in health care policies in the
United Kingdom and elsewhere in an attempt to improve health
(Lagarde, Haines, & Palmer, 2007; Le Grand, 2008). They are
most effective in promoting “one-off” behaviors, such as getting
vaccinated (Achat, Mcintyre, & Burgess, 1999; Seal et al., 2003;
Sutherland, Christianson, & Leatherman, 2008). Indeed, findings
from systematic reviews suggest that financial incentives can
increase uptake of recommended vaccinations by both adults and
children (Briss et al., 2000; Giuffrida & Torgerson, 1997; Kane,
Johnson, Town, & Butler, 2004; Ndiaye et al., 2005; Stone et al.,
2002; Sutherland et al., 2008). Their effectiveness is predicted to
depend on recipients’ level of social and material deprivation.
Consequently, one potential advantage of using financial incen-
tives to promote health is that they may be more effective in
motivating behavior change in the most socially deprived (Suther-
land et al., 2008). When applied to HPV-vaccination programs,
incentives therefore have the potential not only to improve the
below-target uptake rates but also to reduce social inequalities.
Most of the calls to use incentives in HPV-vaccination programs in
the United Kingdom, however, have focused on incentivizing
vaccination providers (e.g., general practitioners) rather than vac-
cination recipients (Tanday, 2008). The effectiveness of financial
incentives in this latter context is therefore currently unknown.
Furthermore, no studies have assessed the role of social depriva-
tion in the moderation of the impact of financial incentives on
vaccination uptake.
The exact mechanisms by which financial incentives operate
to influence behavior, including vaccination uptake, are cur-
rently unknown. In theory, they are likely to work via learning-
theory principles, by linking the target behavior to a positively
evaluated stimulus (e.g., a reward with monetary value), thus
strengthening the value associated with it (Marteau, 2010).
From an economics perspective, this increases the utility gained
from performing the target behavior, thus providing an impetus
for individuals to act (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Dawes, 1999;
Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001; Lopes, 1994; Zwick, Erev, & Bu-
descu, 1999). At the same time, financial incentives might work
by shifting people’s expectations of the likely consequences of
the target behavior in a positive direction, or by facilitating
allocation of limited cognitive capacity, in such a way as to
achieve the now more highly valued target behavior (Marteau,
2010). These possibilities suggest that financial incentives may
enable people to overcome the costs and barriers associated
with initiating the target behavior and/or shift their perception
of the related cost– benefit ratio, such that the benefits of
performing the related behavior outweigh the costs. Certain
theories, such as motivation crowding theory (Frey & Jegen,
2001) and cognitive evaluation theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985),
predict that the offer of incentives might sometimes have the
opposite effect to the one intended. However, the extent to
which this can occur in the context of health-related behaviors
has been questioned (Promberger & Marteau, 2013).
Even if effective in increasing uptake of HPV vaccinations,
the use of financial incentives in HPV-vaccination programs
will need to be considered in the context of their possible
negative consequences. Unlike most interventions designed to
change behavior, the use of financial incentives raises particular
concerns regarding their potentially adverse effects on the qual-
ity of people’s decisions to engage in incentivized behaviors.
For example, it has been argued that the prospect of receiving
a financial reward could result in the risks associated with the
incentivized behavior being overlooked (Marteau, Ashcroft, &
Oliver, 2009). This is particularly relevant to behaviors asso-
ciated with physical and/or psychological side effects, such as
getting vaccinated. To date, no known studies have assessed the
impact of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to
engage in incentivized behaviors.
Assessing the quality of health-related decisions is important, as
it allows predictions to be made regarding the psychological and
physiological adjustment of patients (Johnston & Vögele, 1993;
Marteau, Dormandy, & Michie, 2001). One way to judge the
quality of a decision to engage in a behavior is to assess whether
it represents an informed choice. An informed choice has been
operationally defined as one that is based on knowledge of the
relevant information, is consistent with the decision-maker’s val-
ues, and is behaviorally implemented (Marteau et al., 2001). These
three dimensions of informed choice are also echoed in definitions
of informed decision making (Bekker, Hewison, & Thornton,
2004; Dowie, 2002; Irwig, McCaffery, Salkeld, & Bossuyt, 2006;
Jepson, Hewison, Thompson, & Weller, 2005; Rimer, Briss,
Zeller, Chan, & Woolf, 2004) and clinical decision quality (Sepu-
cha, Fowler, & Mulley, 2004). Using this operationalization a
multidimensional measure of informed choice has been developed
(Marteau et al., 2001), validated (Michie, Dormandy, & Marteau,
2002), and used to assess the quality of decisions in the context of
screening (e.g., Dormandy, Michie, Hooper, & Marteau, 2006;
Dormandy, Tsui, & Marteau, 2007; Jaques, Sheffield, & Halliday,
2005; Kellar et al., 2008; Mathieu et al., 2007; Michie, Dormandy,
& Marteau, 2003; Smith et al., 2010). Given that both screening
and vaccination uptake involve preventative behaviors with poten-
tial side effects, this measure can readily be used to assess decision
quality in the context of HPV vaccination uptake.
The present study is the first trial that addresses the aforemen-
tioned uncertainties with regard to the use of financial incentives in
1 The National Health Service (NHS) is a publicly funded health care
system within the United Kingdom, which provides a comprehensive range
of health services, the vast majority of which are free at the point of use for
residents of the United Kingdom of England, Scotland, Wales, and North-
ern Ireland. HPV vaccinations are provided free through the NHS to girls
aged 12 to 18 years of age. The HPV vaccine is delivered largely through
secondary schools but is also offered through general practitioners (pri-
mary care physicians) and community clinics. Parental consent is not
required for vaccinating adolescents over 16 years of age.
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HPV vaccination programs. The specific aims of this trial are (a)
to assess the impact of financial incentives on initial uptake and
completion of an HPV-vaccination program, and (b) to examine
whether the impact of financial incentives on uptake and comple-
tion of an HPV-vaccination program is moderated by recipients’
level of social deprivation. The trial further aims to assess the
impact of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to be
vaccinated, as measured by participants’ attitudes toward the vac-
cination and their knowledge of its health consequences. It was
hypothesized that girls who were offered financial incentives to get
vaccinated against HPV would be more likely to receive the first
and third HPV vaccinations. Participants’ level of social depriva-
tion was hypothesized to moderate the effects of financial incen-
tives on uptake of the first and third HPV vaccinations, with larger
effects of the incentives being predicted for the most socially
deprived. In line with existing concerns, it was further hypothe-
sized that compared with nonincentivized girls, those offered fi-
nancial incentives would have less positive attitudes toward the
HPV vaccination and would be less knowledgeable about its health
consequences.
Method
Trial Design
The present study is is a parallel-group randomized controlled
trial. Further details of the study methods are available in the trial
protocol (Mantzari, Vogt, & Marteau, 2012b).2
Context
Between 2008 and 2009, the uptake rates in England for the
“catch-up” HPV-vaccination campaign, targeting females aged 17
to 18 years, was 62.2% for the first vaccination, 54.2% for the
second vaccination, and 31.8% for the third vaccination (Sheridan
et al., 2010). The equivalent figures for the Birmingham East and
North (BEN) Primary Care Trust, where this trial was conducted,
were 72.2%, 64.6%, and 34.2%, respectively (Sheridan et al.,
2010).
Participants
Participants were one thousand 16- to 18-year-old girls: 500 had
not yet received an invitation to attend the vaccination program
(first-time invitees), and 500 had previously received an invitation
to get vaccinated, but had failed to attend the first vaccination
appointment (previous nonattenders). All girls lived in Birming-
ham, United Kingdom, and (a) were registered with general prac-
titioners within the BEN and Heart of Birmingham Primary Care
Trusts; (b) were eligible to be vaccinated through the participating
community clinics (Sutton Cottage, Partners in Health, and Dove
Medical Centre); and (c) had not been vaccinated against HPV
before.
Recruitment and Randomization
Participants were selected randomly from a list of names of all
girls aged 16 to 18 years registered with participating general
practitioners (see Figure 1). After excluding girls not meeting the
inclusion criteria, the list was sorted according to whether girls
were first-time invitees or previous nonattenders. Five hundred
girls were randomly selected from each of these two sublists for
inclusion in the trial, using the RAND() function in Excel, and
were then randomized via the same technique to control versus
intervention conditions (see Table 1).
Intervention
Invitation letters. All participants received letters, addressed
to them, inviting them to attend their first HPV vaccination ses-
sion. The letters included the date, time, and venue of their
allocated vaccination appointment. Participants were given the
option to reschedule their appointment or attend a different immu-
nization clinic by contacting the immunization team at a desig-
nated telephone number, included in the letter.3
Information leaflet. Along with the invitation letters, all par-
ticipants were sent a leaflet containing information about HPV and
the HPV vaccine. This was the standard leaflet used and distrib-
uted by the NHS.4 It included information on the prevalence of
HPV (i.e., that it is common, with most people getting infected at
some point in their life), on how it spreads (i.e., through sexual
activity with somebody who has the virus), on the different types
of HPV that exist and their relationship to cervical cancer (i.e., that
more than 100 types of HPV exist, but only 13 are known to cause
cancer, with others being harmless or causing conditions such as
genital warts), on the benefit of the HPV vaccine (i.e., that it
reduces the risk of getting cervical cancer by 70%), on the limited
protection afforded by it (i.e., that it protects against only the two
types of the virus most often linked to cancer, but not against
others or other sexually transmitted diseases, and does not prevent
pregnancy), as well as on the consequences of getting vaccinated
(i.e., the vaccine’s side effects—described as few and mild—and
the continued need to undergo cervical cancer screening in the
future). Participants wishing to obtain further information were
directed to the relevant NHS Website.
Offer of financial incentives. Participants in the intervention
groups received an invitation letter, which included the offer of
Love2Shop vouchers worth £45 (€52; $65) for receiving the three
vaccinations.3
The vouchers could be exchanged at numerous stores in the
United Kingdom, including general merchandise and department
stores; fashion and footwear retailers; specialist retailers (e.g.,
bookstores); jewelry shops; sports, outdoor, and motoring stores;
home improvement and soft furnishing stores; restaurants; and
leisure facilities (e.g., cinemas).5
The total amount was based on the only existing study of which
we are aware, which assessed the impact of incentives on uptake
of a vaccination requiring completion of three doses (Seal et al.,
2003). In the Seal et al. study, participants were offered $60 (£40)
for receiving three doses of the hepatitis B vaccine ($20 for each
2 Published protocol available at www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/
12/301
3 An example of the letter is available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/
content/supplementary/1472-6963-12-301-s1.pdf
4 An example of the leaflet is available at http://www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/
17-18.pdf
5 For more information, visit http://www.highstreetvouchers.com/gift-
vouchers/love2shop
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dose). Unlike this study, however, which offered fixed-value re-
wards for each vaccination, participants in the present study were
offered larger rewards for receiving the first and third vaccination,
in an attempt to motivate initiation and completion of the vacci-
nation program. Specifically, they were offered £20 (€23; $29) for
receiving the first vaccination, £5 (€6; $7) for the second vacci-
nation, and £20 (€23; $29) for the third vaccination. The exact
amounts offered for each vaccination were chosen through discus-
sion with experts.
Reminder text messages. Participants in the intervention
groups received text messages reminding them of their second and
third vaccination sessions. These were sent during the intervals
between the first and second vaccinations, and between the second
and third vaccinations, and 2 days prior to the next session. The
wording of these messages was, “(Name), don’t forget your HPV
jab on (day) at (time) at the (venue). Thank you.” Participants were
not able to reply to these messages. Participants in the control
groups did not receive these reminder text messages.
Figure 1. Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) flow diagram.
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Outcome Measures
Uptake. Uptake of each vaccination was recorded at the com-
munity clinics where vaccinations took place and was measured as
the proportion of those invited who received each vaccination.
Social deprivation. Area-level social deprivation was mea-
sured using participants’ postcodes to calculate English Index of
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) scores, which range from 0.37 (least
deprived) to 85.46 (most deprived) (Community & Neighbor-
hoods, 2007). The IMD is a measure of deprivation in England
based on area of residence. It measures deprivation at the small-
area level, that is, the Lower Layer Super Output Area. It is derived
from seven indices of deprivation, including income, employment,
health deprivation and disability, education skills and training,
barriers to housing, and services and crime. These are combined
into a single deprivation score for each small area in England.
Quality of decisions to undergo vaccinations. To assess the
impact of financial incentives on the quality of decisions to un-
dertake the HPV vaccinations, a short modified version of a
validated measure of informed choice was used (Marteau et al.,
2001), consisting of the following:
1. Two items rated on a 7-point scale, assessing attitudes
toward the HPV vaccination: “For me, having the HPV
vaccination is (a) 1 (not at all good) to 7 (extremely good)
and (b) 1 (not at all harmful) to 7 (extremely harmful).”
Scores obtained on the latter item were reverse coded.
2. Three items assessing knowledge of the HPV vaccina-
tion. These items requested that participants determine
the validity (whether “true” or “false”) of three state-
ments relating to the vaccination: “If I have the HPV
vaccination . . .,” (a) “I am less likely to get cervical
cancer”; (b) “I am less likely to get other sexually trans-
mitted diseases”; (c) “I am less likely to get pregnant.”
Participants were also requested to state their main reason for
getting vaccinated.
The original measure of informed choice was developed for use
in the context of prenatal screening and consists of eight items
assessing knowledge and four items assessing attitudes (Marteau et
al., 2001). The component scales have been shown to have good
internal consistency, predictive validity, and discriminant validity
(Michie et al., 2002). For the purposes of the present study, the
knowledge items were adapted to assess awareness of the most
important issues regarding uptake of the HPV vaccination, includ-
ing the vaccine’s benefits and limited protection. These issues
were highlighted in the information leaflet participants received.
Their importance in comparison with the other information pre-
sented in the leaflet was judged and determined by a panel of
experts. In order to reduce response burden, only three knowledge
items were included (Cronbach’s   .64). Similarly, only two out
of the four original attitude items were chosen for inclusion—one
assessing affective attitudes, requesting participants to indicate
how good they think the HPV vaccination is and one assessing
instrumental attitudes, requesting participants to indicate how
harmful they think the HPV vaccination is. These were adapted
from the original scale through rephrasing (Cronbach’s   .63).
Procedure
The financial incentive scheme was run by the BEN Primary
Care Trust (in partnership with the Young Foundation). Partici-
pants were selected and recruited into the scheme by the Birming-
ham Primary Care Shared Services Agency, who holds and con-
trols all patient data in Birmingham, United Kingdom.
Recruitment took place between February and March of 2010.
The vaccination sessions were conducted at three community
clinics (Sutton Cottage, Partners in Health, and Dove Medical
Centre) between March and September 2010, by nurses working
with Heart of Birmingham Primary Care Trust. When attending
their first session, participants signed a consent form, completed
the measure of informed choice, and selected a date for their next
vaccination. Delivery of each vaccination was contingent on com-
pletion of all previous doses. After getting vaccinated, participants
in the intervention groups were handed the appropriate vouchers.
Research Governance
The intervention was run by Healthy Incentives, a social enter-
prise arising as a result of a partnership between the Young
Foundation and the NHS BEN Primary Care Trust. The use of
vaccination invitation letters, information leaflets, and reminder
text messages were part of the latter’s standard health services.
Also part of the Primary Care Trust’s standard practice is the use
of records reflecting attendance in vaccination programs of all
eligible patients registered within the Trust. These records are
routinely used to create reports. The offer of financial incentives
was introduced as part of the Primary Care Trust’s innovation in
health service development and delivery. Permission to implement
the incentive scheme was granted by the Primary Care Trust,
which was responsible for all related insurance and indemnity
arrangements. Participants’ anonymity and privacy were protected
by the Data Protection Act (United Kingdom Parliament, 1998).
The design that Healthy Incentives used was a Zelen design, which
involves randomization before consent from participants has been
sought. This is used particularly when evaluating the full, unbiased
impact of screening interventions, in which knowledge of the trial
by control groups may affect outcomes (Schellings et al., 2009;
Torgerson & Roland, 1998; Zelen, 1979), such as in the present
study. Ethical approval was sought for researchers at King’s Col-
lege London to access data from the BEN Primary Care Trust in
order to evaluate the financial incentives scheme and publish
relevant findings. This was granted by the BEN Research Ethics
Committee (reference 11/WM/0073, April 8, 2011). NHS Permis-
sion for Research was granted by the Birmingham and the Black
Country Comprehensive Local Research Network (BBC CLRN)
Research Management & Governance (RM&G) Consortium Of-
fice on behalf of the BBC CLRN RM&G Consortium Trusts
(reference BENPC040.44791, August 1, 2011).
Table 1
Description of Trial Groups
First-time invitees Previous nonattenders
Control
group
250 (sent standard invitation
letters; no incentives)
250 (sent standard invitation
letters; no incentives)
Intervention
group
250 (sent modified invitation
letters; incentives)
250 (sent modified invitation
letters; incentives)
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Statistical Analysis
To assess the impact of the intervention on initial uptake (i.e.,
uptake of the first vaccination) and completion of the HPV-
vaccination program (i.e., uptake of the third vaccination), logistic
regressions were performed separately for first-time invitees and
previous nonattenders. To test the moderating effect of social
deprivation on the impact of the intervention, the interaction be-
tween IMD scores and intervention was added to the logistic
regression models. To test whether there was a difference in the
effect size of the intervention in the two samples, data sets were
combined and another logistic regression was conducted, in which
sample (i.e., first-time invitees vs. previous nonattenders) was
added as a predictor of the model, along with the intervention. The
chi-square test was used to test for differences in attrition rates
from the first to the third vaccination between the intervention and
control groups. Differences in knowledge of the HPV vaccination
between intervention and control groups were tested using the
chi-square test, and differences in attitudes toward the HPV vac-
cination were examined using one-way analysis of variance. All
tests were assessed at the 5% level of significance.
Results
All groups were comparable in age and social deprivation (see
Table 2). Data met the linearity of the logit and multicollinearity
assumptions required for the logistic regression analyses.
Uptake of the First HPV Vaccination
Financial incentives significantly increased initial uptake of the
HPV-vaccination program by approximately 10% (see Table 3) in
both first-time invitees (OR  1.63, 95% CI [1.075, 2.472]; see
Table 4) and previous nonattenders (OR  1.63, 95% CI [1.075,
2.472]; see Table 4). The effect size did not vary between the two
samples (nonsignificant interaction between group [intervention
vs. control] and previous invitation; OR  0.611, 95% CI [0.319,
1.172], p  .05).
Uptake of the Third HPV Vaccination
The combination of financial incentives and text messages sig-
nificantly increased completion of the HPV-vaccination program
by about 10% (see Table 3) in both first-time invitees (OR 
2.152, 95% CI [1.324, 3.496]; see Table 4) and previous nonat-
tenders (OR  4.283, 95% CI [1.920, 9.551]; see Table 4). The
size of effect was similar in the two samples (nonsignificant
interaction between group and previous invitation; OR  0.494,
95% CI [0.194, 1.257]; p  .05).
Reduction in Uptake From First to Third Vaccination
Attrition between trial arms was similar. For first-time invitees,
the attrition rate was 6% in the intervention group versus 7.6% in
the control group, 2(1, n  500)  0.50, p  .05. For previous
nonattenders, the attrition rate was 11.2% in the intervention
groups versus 7.4% in the control group, 2(1, n  500)  2.39,
p  .05 (see Figure 2).
Social Deprivation
The effect of the intervention on uptake of the first and third
vaccinations was not moderated by social deprivation in either
first-time invitees (first vaccination: OR  0.985, 95% CI [0.954,
1.017]; third vaccination: OR  1.002, 95% CI [0.967, 1.038]) or
previous nonattenders (first vaccination: OR  0.998, 95% CI
[0.76, 1.021]; third vaccination: OR  1.007, 95% CI [0.966,
1.049]).
Social deprivation was unrelated to uptake of the first and third
HPV vaccinations among first-time invitees. For previous nonat-
tenders, higher levels of social deprivation were associated with a
reduced chance of uptake for the third vaccination (OR  0.980,
95% CI [0.964, 0.996], but not the first vaccination; see Table 4).
Quality of Decisions
The quality of decisions to undergo the HPV vaccination was
similar in the two trial arms: attitudes were similarly positive
(first-time invitees: intervention group: M 5.8, SD 1.1, control
group: M  5.3, SD  1.2; previous nonattenders: intervention
group: M 5.7, SD 1.2, control group: M 6.1, SD 0.7, F[3,
188]  1.203, p  .05.) and knowledge similarly high (first-time
invitees: intervention group: 81.5% correct answers, control group:
84.5% correct answers; previous nonattenders: intervention group:
88.2% correct answers, control group: 87.5% correct answers),
2  (9, n  193)  9.017, p  .05.
Responses to a question about possible reasons for getting
vaccinated also revealed no differences between groups (data
available from authors).
Discussion
Consistent with the hypotheses, the offer of financial incentives
increased the proportion of girls undergoing an initial HPV vac-
cination, and the combination of financial incentives and reminder
text messages increased the proportion of girls completing the
course of three HPV vaccinations. Contrary to predictions, these
effects did not vary with level of social deprivation. Also contrary
to predictions, there was no evidence to suggest that girls’ attitudes
toward the HPV vaccination and their knowledge of its health
consequences were affected by the offer of financial incentives.
Meaning of the Results
Findings from the current study are consistent with previous
research demonstrating the effectiveness of financial incentives in
promoting immunizations (Achat et al., 1999; Briss et al., 2000;
Seal et al., 2003). Incentives may have operated by increasing the
anticipated benefits of attending vaccination appointments suffi-
ciently to overcome any perceived barriers. One of the barriers
Table 2
Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants (Mean [SD])
Characteristic
First-time invitees Previous nonattenders
Intervention Control Intervention Control
Age 17.9 (0.76) 18.0 (0.69) 17.8 (0.81) 18.0 (0.74)
Social deprivation
(IMD) 46.3 (13.12) 45.3 (13.0) 35.3 (21.9) 36.2 (22.2)
Note. IMD  Index of Multiple Deprivation.
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most strongly predicting uptake of the HPV vaccination is cost
(Conroy et al., 2009). Although HPV vaccinations are free as part
of normal care in the United Kingdom, getting vaccinated entails
expenses, such as transport costs for attending clinics. Incentives
may have operated by removing such financial barriers. Indeed, it
has been shown that patients often use their rewards to cover
expenses related to engaging in the target health behavior (Post,
Cruz, & Harman, 2006). Girls in the current study could not use
their incentives to directly pay for their transportation costs, as the
incentives were offered in the form of vouchers. However, anec-
dotal evidence from a voucher-based incentive scheme targeting
smoking cessation during pregnancy (Mantzari, Vogt, & Marteau,
2012a) suggests that incentivized individuals often engage in men-
tal accounting, according to which transportation costs are de-
ducted from the value of the vouchers in order to determine net
gains.
The incentives increased uptake of the vaccination by 10%, a
surplus that the intervention maintained throughout completion
of the program, without reducing attrition between the first and
third vaccinations. This finding could be taken as an indication
of the superior effectiveness of the initial incentive, which may
have been sufficient in maintaining the higher uptake rates
without the subsequent incentives. It is not possible, however,
to infer exactly how removal of the additional incentives would
have affected the results. The relative effectiveness of the
incentives for each HPV vaccination should be examined in
future research.
One potential advantage of financial incentives is that they
may be more effective in motivating behavior change in the
most socially deprived (Sutherland et al., 2008). Contrary to
such predictions, however, social deprivation did not moderate
the effect of incentives in the present study. Perhaps the role of
social deprivation depends on the type of behavior being tar-
geted, and might therefore be limited in modifying the impact
of incentives on uptake of the HPV vaccinations. It is also
possible, however, that this finding is related to the measure of
social deprivation used in this study. Although IMD scores have
been previously used to assess participants’ level of deprivation
(Marteau et al., 2010), current findings may have resulted from
the use of a proxy rather than a direct measure of social
deprivation. Alternatively, it is possible that the range of social
deprivation in the current study was too limited to allow for an
effect to be detected. Future studies should aim to include
participants to reflect a wider range of socioeconomic statuses.
Although the intervention in the present study was effective
in promoting the HPV vaccination, the highest uptake rates
observed were 28.4% for the first vaccination and 22.4% for the
third (by first-time invitees in the intervention group). These
figures are well below the 80% uptake target set by the NHS.
They are also considerably lower than the attendance rates for
the catch-up program in the BEN Primary Care Trust, where
this trial was run (72.2% for the first vaccination, and 34.2% for
the third; Sheridan et al., 2010), as reported by the U.K.
Department of Health (DH). The reasons underlying these dif-
ferences in rates of uptake are unknown. A number of expla-
nations are possible: First, they may reflect cohort differences.
For example, the DH report refers to the attendance rates of 17-
and 18-year-olds, whereas participants in the present study were
aged 16 to 18 years (additional analyses revealed no effect of
age on uptake). Second, they may reflect differences in the
Table 3
Proportion (% [N]) of Individuals in Each Sample and Within Each Group Receiving
the Vaccinations
First-time invitees Previous nonattenders
Intervention
(n  250)
Control
(n  250)
Intervention
(n  250)
Control
(n  250)
First vac 28.4 (n  71) 19.6 (n  49) 23.6 (n  59) 10.4 (n  26)
Second vac 24.4 (n  61) 16.0 (n  40) 19.6 (n  49) 6.4 (n  16)
Third vac 22.4 (n  56) 12.0 (n  30) 12.4 (n  31) 3.0 (n  8)
Note. vac  vaccination.
Table 4
OR and CIs of Group and IMD for First-Time Invitees and Previous Nonattenders for the First and Third Vaccinations
First-time invitees Previous nonattenders
B (SE) OR
95% CI for OR
B (SE) OR
95% CI for OR
Lower Upper Lower Upper
First vac
Group 0.489 (0.212) 1.630 1.075 2.472 0.976 (0.255) 2.654 1.609 4.378
IMD 0.002 (0.008) 0.998 0.983 1.014 0.004 (0.006) 0.996 0.985 1.007
Third vac
Group 0.766 (0.248) 2.152 1.324 3.496 1.455 (0.409) 4.283 1.920 9.551
IMD 0.013 (0.014) 0.987 0.970 1.004 0.020 (0.008) 0.980 0.964 0.996
Note. OR  odds ratio; CI  confidence interval; IMD  Index of Multiple Deprivation; vac  vaccination.
 p  .05.
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methods of patient recruitment and delivery of the HPV-
vaccination programs. For example, delivery of HPV vaccina-
tions through general practitioners is less effective compared
with delivery through schools (Sheridan et al., 2010). Third,
they may reflect issues with the reliability of the data reported
in the DH report or the Primary Care Trust’s records. Anecdotal
reports suggest that the latter’s records were not up-to-date,
with girls who had already received the HPV vaccination
through schools being invited for the present scheme; similar
errors might have occurred when feeding figures into the DH
report.
Strengths
The main strength of this study is its novelty. It is the first
study to assess the effectiveness of financial incentives for
increasing uptake of the HPV vaccinations. It is also the first
study, to our knowledge, that assesses deprivation level as a
moderator of a financial incentive scheme. The incentive
scheme used was designed to maximize retention: Unlike other
studies that have offered fixed-value rewards for each vaccina-
tion (Seal et al., 2003), larger incentives (£20) were offered at
the beginning and end of the program, to motivate participants
to initiate and complete the vaccinations.
Limitations
Although the results of this study demonstrate the effective-
ness of financial incentives in increasing initial uptake of the
HPV vaccination, they do not allow conclusive inferences to be
made regarding the absolute impact of incentives on completion
of the program. Girls in the intervention groups received re-
minder text messages prior to their second and third vaccination
appointments. Due to an error made by the administration team,
these reminder messages were not delivered to girls in the
control groups. Vaccine recall and reminder systems are known
to increase vaccination rates (Jacobson Vann & Szilagyi, 2005).
It is therefore possible that the higher uptake rates of the third
vaccination by the intervention groups are attributable to the
reminder text messages, with incentives having no additional
effect. This seems unlikely, given that incentives work best in
combination with reminder systems and standing orders
(Sutherland et al., 2008). Future research should examine the
contribution of these interventions separately.
Our findings provide no evidence to suggest that financial
incentives compromise the quality of decisions to engage in an
incentivized behavior, with incentivized and nonincentivized
girls’ attitudes toward the vaccination being similarly positive
and their knowledge of its consequences similarly high. Perhaps
the total amount girls could receive (£45) was not large enough
to unduly influence their decision to get vaccinated had they
held strong views against doing so. However, some limitations
associated with the measurement of informed choice in this
study reduce the certainty of the conclusions that can be drawn.
First, as mentioned previously, we used a simplified version of
a measure of informed choice originally developed and vali-
dated for use in the context of screening. The resulting measure
Figure 2. Drop-off in uptake of HPV vaccinations over time for each of the trial groups. The color version of
this figure appears in the online article only.
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may not have been sensitive enough to adequately assess in-
formed choice in relation to HPV vaccination uptake. Further
research is needed to validate the measure for use in this
specific context. Second, the reliability of the measure was
relatively low (Cronbach’s   0.63). Although related con-
cerns might be partially alleviated by the questionable stability
and appropriateness of the alpha coefficient for two-item scales
(Cramer, Atwood, & Stoner, 2006; O’Brien, Buikstra, &
Hegney, 2008; Sainfort & Booske, 2000; Verhoef, 2003), in-
terpretation of the relevant findings nonetheless requires cau-
tion. Third, the measure relied on assessment of attitudes as a
proxy of values, which, according to the operational definition
of informed choice, need to be congruent with choices (Marteau
et al., 2001). Although attitudes have been argued to reflect
values (Marteau et al., 2001; Rokeach, 1968), the extent to
which their measurement captures core values as traditionally
conceptualized and measured (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz,
1992) is unknown (Marteau, 2009). Furthermore, the measure-
ment of attitudes alone provides little understanding of the
potentially conflicting values individuals may hold when con-
sidering health-related decisions and how these affect their
ability to make informed choices (Marteau, 2009). Further
research is needed that will lead to the development of measures
that better capture the values that underlie human health-related
decisions (Marteau, 2009), which will, in turn, lead to more
valid assessments of decision quality. Fourth, girls’ knowledge
of the vaccination’s side effects was not assessed in this study.
Consequently, no inferences can be made about whether the
offer of a financial reward results in the risks associated with
the incentivized behavior being overlooked (Marteau et al.,
2009). Another limitation is related to the timing of assessment.
Girls were requested to complete the measure of informed
choice once they had decided to get vaccinated. It is therefore
possible that their attitudes toward the vaccination might have
been influenced by their decision to receive it, rather than being
a predictor of that decision. Furthermore, assessing related
attitudes and knowledge after the offer of financial incentives
does not allow inferences to be made regarding the mechanisms
by which incentives might have influenced the decision-making
process. For example, it remains uncertain whether incentives
facilitated girls with positive attitudes toward the vaccination to
act in line with their values or whether the incentives changed
the girls’ attitudes to make them more positive. Furthermore, by
not having measures of attitudes by nonattenders, the insights
afforded by such a comparison with attenders were not possible.
Future research should aim to assess individuals’ knowledge
and values related to an incentivized behavior before incentives
are offered. Including subsequent behavior in the assessment, as
proposed by Marteau et al. (2001), will allow for a more valid
assessment of informed choice and will help elucidate the
mechanisms by which incentives influence health-related deci-
sions. Finally, our findings do not allow firm conclusions to be
drawn regarding the possibility of incentives to negatively
influence autonomy and people’s ability to voluntarily make
decisions, and thus coerce them, as the measure of informed
choice did not directly tap into these concepts. Further research
should aim to complement the assessment of informed choice
with measures that allow for a more direct and precise asse-
ssment of whether incentives are coercive and undermine
autonomous choices, such as the Decisional Conflict Scale
(O’Connor, 1995).
Implications
While the incentive scheme increased uptake of HPV vacci-
nations, it is unknown whether such effects can be achieved in
more cost-effective and acceptable ways. Other HPV-
vaccination programs, such as those rolled out in schools
(Sheridan et al., 2010), have achieved higher uptake rates than
those achieved in this trial, without the expense of vouchers.
Before the use of incentives is considered for wider implemen-
tation, research is needed to determine the optimal incentive
value and delivery schedule for achieving maximum vaccina-
tion rates, supplemented with a formal cost-effectiveness anal-
ysis. Such cost-effectiveness analyses will need to take into
account the extent to which the use of incentives might result in
unintended consequences. These include (a) the potentially
adverse effect of incentives on intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koes-
tner, & Ryan, 1999), which might reduce the likelihood of
individuals engaging in future health-related behaviors without
the offer of rewards, and (b) the possibility for the offer of
incentives to result in people refusing to adopt the incentivized
behavior due to arousal of suspicion (Frey & Jegen, 2001).
Even if cost effective, the use of incentives for increasing
HPV vaccinations will depend on their acceptability to policy-
makers, health professionals, and the public. The use of finan-
cial incentives for health promotion attracts negative views
(Promberger, Brown, Ashcroft, & Marteau, 2011), which, cou-
pled with the controversy surrounding the HPV vaccine for
condoning early sexual activity (Waller, Marlow, & Wardle,
2006), may render the use of financial incentives for increasing
HPV vaccinations unacceptable, as evidenced from the media
coverage of the present scheme. For example, the Daily Mail
online wrote, “HMV Voucher Bribe for Teenage Girls to Have
Cervical Jabs: Fury at ‘Promiscuity Scheme’ as NHS Faces
Cuts” (Martin, 2010), and wideshut.co.uk reported, “Girls
Bribed to Take Dangerous and Pointless HPV Vaccine (Balder-
son, 2010).7
Conclusion
The combination of financial incentives and reminder text
messages increased uptake and completion of HPV vaccina-
tions. Even with this intervention, however, the vaccination
rates were considerably lower than the national target of 80%.
Further research could attempt to elucidate the conditions under
which the impact of incentives could be improved. However, it
seems unlikely that the use of incentives alone will be sufficient
to achieve effective HPV vaccination coverage targets in the
United Kingdom. This, in addition to the cost effectiveness and
acceptability issues surrounding the use of incentives in this
context, perhaps highlight the need to consider alternative ways
of achieving such targets.
7 These media reports were published in November 2010, after comple-
tion of the program, which ended in September 2010, limiting the possi-
bility that they may have confounded the results of the study.
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